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
# The Treaties of 1701: A Triumph of Iroquois Diplomacy

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**Abstract.** This essay examines the events that culminated in the 1701 treaties at Montreal and Albany from the perspective of the Five Nations Iroquois. We argue that it was the initiatives and objectives of Iroquois political policy toward New France and her native allies, the Western Indians, that were at the heart of the treaty negotiations of 1700 and 1701. There was considerably more at stake than simply controlling the fur trade. The treaties enabled the Iroquois to achieve their broader and far more important goals of securing their hunting territories and neutralizing the belligerency of New France and her native allies.

Powerful and feared throughout most of the 1600s, by century's end the Five Nations Iroquois had been humbled, if not defeated. Indeed, they had been brought so low that they lost the hunting lands they had fought so long to protect. Or so goes much of the thinking surrounding the events in which the Iroquois were participants from 1696 to 1701.<sup>1</sup> Although some scholars have disputed this view, few if any have portrayed the achievements of the Iroquois during this period, culminating in the treaties of 1701, as singularly positive ones. At best they are said to represent all that these Indians could hope to gain in very difficult circumstances.<sup>2</sup> Yet a closer look at the history of the period reveals that although the Iroquois agreed to put an end to war, they managed to secure by diplomacy what they could not, at least for the present, secure by military might.<sup>3</sup> Not only did they orchestrate a peace with New France, but they parlayed the needed time to reconsider their policies toward that colony. Most importantly, the Iroquois received recognition from the English, the French, and the latter's Indian allies of Iroquois claims to hunting territories north of Lake Ontario.



Map 1. Area pertaining to the 1701 Treaty.

By 1660 the Hurons, Petuns, Eries, Neutrals, and Nipissings, who occupied and controlled the vast territory that is today most of southwestern Ontario, had been overwhelmed and dispersed by the Five Nations (see Map 1).<sup>4</sup> These early military successes enabled the Iroquois to focus their attention on New France and its Indian allies, the “Western Indians.” Iroquois assaults against French and Indian forces would continue until the end of the century. Tenuous truces interrupted hostilities several times, but none was of any duration. The lack of consensus among the Iroquois about how to proceed against the French left individual tribes to pursue their own often conflicting interests. Moreover, Iroquois claims to hunting lands north and west of Lake Ontario and along the St. Lawrence, their desire to protect all their territory from encroachment by outside groups, their long-standing belligerency toward the French, and French designs to exploit the fur trade all worked to preclude a lasting peace.<sup>5</sup>

By the mid-1660s the French had tired of the unrelenting warfare and what they saw as Iroquois intransigence. In 1665 Alexandre de Prouville de Tracy arrived in the colony with a contingent of troops and orders to annihilate the Iroquois. The four western tribes, weakened by warfare and disease, and the least hostile in their attitude toward the French, accepted a peace offer. The Mohawks, however, refused to negotiate, and De Tracy

attacked them in October 1666, burning their villages and destroying their food stores.<sup>6</sup> An uncertain peace followed.

With the peace, Iroquois hunting parties continued to operate in the St. Lawrence Valley from Montreal to the eastern end of Lake Ontario and along its north shore.<sup>7</sup> In 1671 Governor Daniel de Rémy de Courcelles reported that the Iroquois, having “absolutely exhausted the side of Ontario which they inhabit, that is, the South side, a long time ago, so that they experience the greatest difficulty in finding a single beaver there . . . are obliged to cross to the North of the same lake, formerly inhabited by the Hurons, our allies, whom they defeated or drove off; so that it may be said the Iroquois do all their hunting, at present, on our allies’ lands.”<sup>8</sup>

Iroquois use of the lands above Lake Ontario grew beyond the occasional hunting party. By the early 1670s seven villages had been established along the north shore.<sup>9</sup> Jean Talon, the intendant of New France, clearly exasperated by these settlements and the associated hunting activity, reported: “All this Beaver is trapped by the Iroquois in countries subject to the King [of France].”<sup>10</sup>

The reports on Iroquois activity by Courcelles and Talon were meant to draw attention to the vast profits that New France’s economic rivals, for many years the Dutch, and after 1664 the English, were reaping from land that the colony believed was its own. French claims were based on the view that these lands had once belonged to her native allies, a dubious but convenient assertion. At the same time, both men stressed the illegitimate nature and cost of the Iroquois presence to overcome the misgivings of Jean Colbert, the minister at Versailles responsible for the colony. Colbert was opposed to any further westward expansion, whereas Talon hoped to increase the fur trade by building forts on Lake Ontario.<sup>11</sup>

The Iroquois, of course, had a very different view of who possessed these lands. At a meeting with the French in 1700 they asserted that the land north of the lake, especially that around Fort Frontenac, “was the place where we do our hunting since the beginning of the world.”<sup>12</sup>

Neither the French nor the Iroquois were prepared to give up their ambitions for the region. In 1673 New France’s Governor Frontenac met with the headmen from at least four of the seven Iroquois villages on Lake Ontario: Ganeraski, Kenté, Ganatoheskiagon, and Ganeious. Intending to control trade on the lake, Frontenac erected a fort at Cataraqui (present-day Kingston, Ontario) and concluded a treaty between the French and the Iroquois, Algonquins, and Ottawas.<sup>13</sup> Although the Iroquois opposed the fort, they were not militarily able to resist. The French went on to build Fort Niagara in 1676, which was soon followed by St. Joseph on Lake Huron, Crèvecoeur on the Illinois River, and Prudhomme on the Missis-

sippi.<sup>14</sup> These posts were established, in part, to restrict Iroquois influence in the region.

This flurry of French activity angered the Iroquois. They viewed the policies of New France as expansionist and as a direct threat to their security and territory north and west of Lake Ontario.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, with the end of their wars with the Susquehannocks, Mahicans, and the Algonquians of New England in the late 1670s, the Iroquois now were able to more freely pursue their own political, economic, and military interests in the west. French interference with their ambitions would not be tolerated.

A central concern of the Iroquois throughout the latter part of the seventeenth century was the protection of their hunting territories.<sup>16</sup> The inevitable military clashes that followed led ultimately to the councils of 1700 and the treaties of 1701. This is not to say, however, that other factors underlying Iroquois warfare were unimportant. Taking revenge against their enemies, and seizing prisoners for torture and to replace those Iroquois lost to raids and disease, remained important motives.<sup>17</sup> But control of their territories was paramount. Beaver pelts and other furs were traded to Europeans for guns, powder, and lead needed to pursue their wars; hunting also furnished Iroquois people with meat and hides for clothing and footwear.

The efforts of New France to enlarge and consolidate its network of Indian allies were equally disturbing to the Iroquois, who suspected that these alliances would soon be turned against them. That their enemies came well armed with French-supplied guns in their attacks on the Iroquois was clear confirmation of things to come.<sup>18</sup> In response to these and other perceived and real transgressions, and unified in their purpose for the first time, the Iroquois renewed their war with the French and the Western Indians.<sup>19</sup>

At first, the Iroquois refrained from direct assaults on the French. Instead, they carried out a series of generally successful strikes on New France's Indian allies, including the Illinois, Ojibwas, Foxes, and Miamis. When the French responded in force to discourage further depredations, the Iroquois launched an all-out war against the colony.<sup>20</sup>

French officials were not surprised by the bellicosity of the Iroquois. For many it was a signal of their determination to dominate the region, to gain access to hunting territories, and to control the fur trade.<sup>21</sup> But beyond these goals, the French believed that Iroquois ambitions were to destroy, one after another, the Western Indian tribes, then the French fur trade, and finally, New France itself.<sup>22</sup> As they had in 1666, the French readied a military response.

In early 1684 Joseph-Antoine Le Febvre de La Barre, Frontenac's replacement as governor of New France, prepared to launch an assault against

the Iroquois. Meanwhile, New York's Governor Dongan and Iroquois representatives were meeting in Albany to discuss a number of pressing issues, including the threat that La Barre posed. His primary target, the Senecas, were especially agitated by what they saw as contradictions, if not outright duplicity, in La Barre's conduct. "He often forbids us to make War on any of the Nations with whom he Trades," they complained, "and at the same time furnishes them with all sorts of Ammunition, to enable them to destroy us."<sup>23</sup> Anticipating a possible negative outcome of a clash with La Barre's forces, the Senecas underscored their immediate concern: "We cannot live without free Bever-hunting."<sup>24</sup> A related, significant outcome of this meeting was England's assertion of sovereignty over the Iroquois.<sup>25</sup>

La Barre's expedition went nowhere. Influenza and badly managed logistics stalled his army at La Famine on the Salmon River. La Barre was forced instead to negotiate a humiliating settlement with the Iroquois, who contemptuously declared their intention to continue their drive against the Western Indians while warning the French not to interfere.<sup>26</sup>

The year before La Barre's ill-fated campaign, the Onondagas and Cayugas had "transferred" their lands in the upper Susquehanna Valley, claimed by "right of conquest" of the Susquehannocks, to the English in Albany. For his part, Governor Dongan intended to use this arrangement to extend both New York's territory and trade. The Indians, in turn, fully expected that the colony would prevent any further encroachments on this land by Pennsylvania and that "the English will protect them [the Indians] from the French otherwise they [the Indians] shall loose all the Beaver and hunting."<sup>27</sup> The political strategy of placing their lands under English protection, whether or not such protection would be forthcoming, and appealing to English desires for furs was one that the Iroquois would employ in 1701 and again in 1726.

The alliance between the Iroquois and the English strengthened. In 1685 and 1686 Governor Dongan licensed trading expeditions into the Ottawa country, nearly to the doors of the French post at Michilimackinac. He intended to divert what trade he could to Albany.<sup>28</sup> The Iroquois enthusiastically supported this endeavor, as it would not only draw the Great Lakes tribes to Iroquois villages on their way to trade at Albany, but it would deny New France its vital economic and military bases.<sup>29</sup> Irritated by this English attempt to undercut the western trade, the French decided to end by force the competition over furs and punish the Iroquois for waging war against the colony and its Indian allies.

La Barre's replacement as governor was Jacques-René de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville, a highly regarded veteran soldier. In June 1687 Denonville led nearly two thousand French and Indians against the Senecas, scat-

tering their warriors and burning their villages, cornfields, and food stores.<sup>30</sup> In response, the Iroquois, armed and supplied by New York, carried out revenge raids against settlements along the French frontier. By 1689 they had forced the French to abandon, if only temporarily, Forts Frontenac and Niagara and several of their western strongholds.<sup>31</sup> In the same year, King William's War, or the War of the League of Augsburg, broke out between England and France, further complicating matters in the colonies.

The Iroquois continued their attacks on New France, aided and abetted by the English in Albany intent in their efforts to win control over the western fur trade. In late 1689 a large force of Iroquois warriors destroyed the French settlement of Lachine near Montreal, creating panic all along the frontier. Raids continued unabated, seriously disrupting the French fur trade. French reprisals were only a matter of time.

The French sent yet another expedition against the Iroquois, this one led by Count Frontenac, recently reappointed governor. Invading Mohawk country in February 1693, he attacked and burned the Indians' villages and food stores. Frontenac took some three hundred prisoners, although most escaped when his army was hotly pursued by Mohawk warriors and colonists from the Albany area.<sup>32</sup> French attacks nevertheless continued, becoming increasingly effective and destructive.

The French did not limit their raids to the frontier but crossed often into Iroquois hunting grounds. Sensing an opportunity, the Hurons, Miamis, Illinois, and Ottawas harassed the Iroquois in the west, making it difficult and dangerous for the latter to hunt and trap on lands over which they asserted sovereignty. Unlike previous clashes, this warfare did little to hinder the fur trade; the French took in large numbers of furs from their Indian allies who were anxious to purchase arms and ammunition to be used in their fight against the Iroquois.<sup>33</sup>

Hostilities between the French, their Indian allies, and the Iroquois continued. Recognizing that his armies could not destroy the Iroquois, Frontenac tried instead to neutralize them by proposing peace.<sup>34</sup> His efforts, however, were countered by the English, who warned the Iroquois against making any accommodations with the French. For their part, the Iroquois fully expected English material and military assistance in their raids against the French and the Western Indians. Yet their repeated requests went unheeded, an all-too-familiar pattern to them.<sup>35</sup> The Iroquois would have to face the French alone.

In mid-1696 Frontenac assembled nearly all New France's military might, which, bolstered by Indian allies, numbered about 2,200 men. Mounting an attack against the central Iroquois tribes, he drove off the Onondagas who, in their flight, burned their own village. Frontenac then

ordered his soldiers to burn the standing crops in nearby fields. Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, Frontenac's second-in-command, was dispatched to torch the nearby Oneida village and its food stores.<sup>36</sup>

As the seventeenth century drew to a close, the political and military situation of the Iroquois worsened. Between 1687 and 1698 the Iroquois lost over 50 percent of their warrior population. Compounding matters, hostilities between England and France came to an end in 1697 with the Treaty of Ryswick. Although the treaty was silent on the status of the Iroquois, New York's governors Richard Coote, Earl of Bellomont, and his successor, John Nanfan, firmly maintained that the Iroquois were English subjects and that their lands were under the Crown's jurisdiction.

The French argued otherwise. Both Frontenac and his successor, Louis-Hector de Callière, rejected English claims and asserted their own. French claims to lands on which they were building forts and encouraging their Indian allies to occupy and hunt alarmed the Iroquois, for they were now incapable of keeping the French at bay by force of arms alone.<sup>37</sup>

But if the Iroquois were meeting serious opposition to their military policies for the first time in the century, they certainly were not cowed. The French and their allies launched some thirty-three attacks against the Iroquois between 1687 and 1698. The Iroquois responded with forty-nine of their own.<sup>38</sup> And if the Iroquois were weakened and in no position to continue their war unaided, they nonetheless were prepared to continue the fight if the English would provide more than vague promises of material support.<sup>39</sup> As for French and English claims of sovereignty over Iroquois lands, these were rejected out of hand, and there was little either imperial power could do to change the situation.<sup>40</sup>

The reality was that neither the French, their native allies, the English, nor the Iroquois was in a position of sufficient enough strength to pursue their policies unopposed. Frontenac recognized that New France was incapable of defeating the Iroquois, with or without assistance from the Western Indians.<sup>41</sup> Since 1690 the French had almost annually extended the olive branch to the Iroquois, actively pursuing them to make peace with the colony and to remain neutral in any war with the English.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, a decade after peace had been achieved, colonial officials were still warning Versailles that the Iroquois "were more to be feared" than all the English colonies.<sup>43</sup>

Equally prejudicial to New France's position was the growing disaffection of their western allies. Frontenac's expansion of the fur trade to include the Sioux, enemies of the important Ottawa tribes, and his efforts to negotiate peace with the Iroquois without conferring with his Indian allies, tested the colony's ties to the people they needed most to ensure a



military victory.<sup>44</sup> French-Ottawa relations became so strained that in 1695, the Ottawas and Iroquois concluded their own peace, hunting together over the winter.<sup>45</sup> This rapprochement was responsible for the Ottawas not taking part in Frontenac's 1696 raid against the Iroquois.<sup>46</sup> The disaffection of New France's native allies undoubtedly became more pronounced when they learned that almost all the French posts beyond the immediate settled areas of the colony were to be closed.<sup>47</sup> The lack of easy access to trade goods, including arms, reduced their ability to effectively pursue military options against the Iroquois.

New York was equally disadvantaged. Governor Bellomont, aware of the weakened state of the Iroquois, who often pleaded for aid against the French, provided them no protection.<sup>48</sup> He could do little more than write urgent dispatches to England requesting assistance to fortify his and the Indians' frontier.<sup>49</sup> Upset by the lack of assistance, the Iroquois rebuked their colonial partners for their disunity, incompetence, and laxness, to no avail.<sup>50</sup> The peace of Ryswick in 1697 between France and England, of course, precluded any possibility of direct military aid to the Iroquois.

Thus everyone had something to gain by an Iroquois truce with the French and their native allies. For New France it would mean an end to the destructive attacks of the Iroquois against the colony, and possibly access to their lands. For the Western Indians it would mean trade links to Albany at a time when relations with New France, both political and economic, were uncertain, and the conditions of their own fur resources in doubt.<sup>51</sup> Even New York had something to gain. Peace between the Iroquois and the French was a reasonable price to pay if it provided ready access to the furs and markets of New France's native allies.

There is also no question that a truce or a formal peace, if the terms were arranged constructively, would benefit the Iroquois. As it stood, the Iroquois could not continue hostilities against New France without the military support of the English, which in all likelihood would not be forthcoming. Some other way had to be found to minimize the threat the French and their allies posed to Iroquois policies, security, and land.

For some Iroquois a peace with New France must have been viewed as a necessary safeguard and protection from New York. Many resented the high prices charged for goods, especially munitions, which produced accusations of English profiteering.<sup>52</sup> The Senecas had even gone so far as to establish trade links with Pennsylvania, where they might realize better prices for their furs.<sup>53</sup>

Nor were the Iroquois particularly pleased about English plans to build forts in their country. Why forts now, in times of peace, they asked, when

they had been unnecessary during the war?<sup>54</sup> A growing mistrust of the English was fed by rumors that the governor of New York planned to move against the Iroquois, and would either attack or poison them.<sup>55</sup> Had they known that their “ally,” the governor, had been instructed by his superiors to buy “vast tracts of [Iroquois] land . . . for small sums,” they certainly would have had grounds for questioning how well their interests were being served.<sup>56</sup> Some Iroquois may have begun to believe, as they did later in the century, that both the French *and* the English sought their ruin.<sup>57</sup>

Moreover, a truce with New France had the added advantage of minimizing factionalism among the Five Nations. Some Confederacy members regarded continuing a war against New France as futile. Others were less than willing to end hostilities. A truce, or a declared neutrality, however, might allow each faction to pursue its own policy without directly opposing that of the other. In a consensus-based society, this was an important consideration. Each side, therefore, could work to convince its followers to accept a peace, at least temporarily, reasoning that, in time, the other side would follow. The option remained for the Iroquois to resume their war against the colony and its native allies.<sup>58</sup>

In short, peace with New France and her native allies seemed the wisest and most judicious course for the Iroquois. This realization brought the Iroquois to the peace table. They had not been defeated. And they did not come on their knees.<sup>59</sup>

By the early summer of 1700 the Five Nations had decided on a strategy for peace. Having apparently set aside their own political differences, they initiated negotiations with New France, New York, and the Western Indians, determined to protect their territorial, political, and economic interests. They began with the Western Indians.

For a number of years the Iroquois had worked to settle their differences with the Western Indians and to persuade them to relocate closer to their villages and away from French influence.<sup>60</sup> An agreement with the Ottawas in 1695 had not lasted. In June 1700, however, five headmen representing three groups of Indians known to the Iroquois as “Dowaganhaes”<sup>61</sup> stood before a council at Onondaga:

Wee are come to acquaint you that wee are settled on y<sup>e</sup> North side of Cadarachqui Lake near Tchojachiage where wee plant a tree of peace and open a path for all people, quite to Corlaer’s [Iroquois term for governor of New York] house, where wee desire to have free liberty of trade; wee make a firme league with y<sup>e</sup> Five Nations and Corlaer

and desire to be united in y<sup>e</sup> Covenant Chain, our hunting places to be one, and to boile in one kettle, eat out of one dish, & with one spoon, and so be one.<sup>62</sup>

The presentation of a wampum belt confirmed that a state of “perpetual peace and friendship” now existed between the Five Nations and these Western Indians. “Let this peace be firm and lasting,” the Iroquois’ spokesman declared, “then shall wee grow old and grey headed together; else y<sup>e</sup> warr will devour us both.”<sup>63</sup>

The Western Indians had come to the Iroquois to request that they share hunting territories—as in the phrase, “Our hunting places to be one, and to boile in one kettle, eat out of one dish, & with one spoon, and so be one”—and through this gain access to Albany and trade.<sup>64</sup> That this was their intent was made plain one year later during negotiations with the French, when the Western Indians revealed that they had dangerously depleted their fur resources.<sup>65</sup> For the Iroquois, sharing their territory with the Dowaganhaes was the price they had to pay to hunt undisturbed on their lands. It was also a way for them to draw an ally of New France to their side. As the Iroquois had remarked on an earlier occasion involving one of the western tribes, to make peace with the Indians that are in “allyance with the French of Canida . . . will strengthen us and weaken the enemij.”<sup>66</sup>

Some of the Western Indians, however, were not prepared to make peace and continued their raids against the Iroquois. Altogether aware of the alliance between the Western Indians and New France, several Onondaga and Oneida headmen brought their complaints of continued depredations and the killing of their people to Governor Callière. “You are the cause of your own destruction yourselves,” Callière told the Indians, yet he urged them to send

one Indian from each Castle [village] (neither will I tye you to send a Sachim, but a private Indian from each nation) to treat with me and make peace, I will take the hatchet out of the hands of my Indians and Children the Dowaganhaes and those other far Indians, and cause you to hunt secure without any trouble or fear. . . . but if you will not come and treat with me, you must expect no peace but a continuall warr with the Dowaganhaes.<sup>67</sup>

Callière was apparently so troubled by the possibility that the Iroquois might arrange similar agreements with others of his allies that he attempted to mislead their delegation into beginning peace talks. The weakness of his position is revealed in that he would not require the Iroquois to send their headmen, but only representatives from each tribe. He must have known

that such a peace would mean little to the Iroquois.<sup>68</sup> Yet he may have hoped that even a minimal consideration of peace might force the headmen to become involved and thus be persuaded to come to terms. At every turn in the negotiations the French governor sent envoys to encourage the Iroquois to continue their talks.<sup>69</sup>

In late August 1700 a conference was held between the Iroquois and New York, one that would lead directly to the 1701 Treaty at Albany.<sup>70</sup> Several immediate issues determined the conference agenda. Bellomont's first order of business was to dismiss widespread and disturbing rumors of an Anglo-French plot to destroy the Iroquois. A related issue was the prospect of French influence on the Iroquois through the endeavors of Jesuit priests. He therefore proposed as a countermeasure placing one or two ministers at Onondaga, with the provision that a fort be built for their and the Indians' security.<sup>71</sup> Through their spokesman Aqueendera, the Iroquois tried to reassure the English of their loyalty.<sup>72</sup> Although they agreed not to heed the French, they only tentatively welcomed Bellomont's ministers, and they were noncommittal about the fort.<sup>73</sup>

The Iroquois then raised the issue of their peace with the Dowagahaes, who were to settle on the "other side of Cadarachqui Lake," specifically mentioning the Mississaugas, Ojibwas, and a third unidentifiable group.<sup>74</sup> Having promised these Indians access to Albany, the Iroquois demanded that the trade there be regulated fairly, pointedly reminding Bellomont that it was the trade "which induc'd us at first to make the Covenant Chain together."<sup>75</sup>

Bellomont, however, wanted to expand Albany's trade to include more Western Indians than those relative few who were to settle on Lake Ontario. "You must needs be sensible," he cautioned, "that the Dowagahaes, Twichtwicks [Miamis], Ottawawa, & Dionondades [Wyandots] and other remote Indians are vastly more numerous then you Five Nations, and that by their continuall warring upon you they will in a few yeares totally destroy you."<sup>76</sup> He suggested that it would be "good policy" to extend the Covenant Chain to all the Western Indians. "Then," he inveigled the Iroquois, "you might at all times without any sort of hazard goe a hunting into their country, which I understand is much the best for Beaver hunting."<sup>77</sup>

Bellomont's speech reflects an incomplete understanding of the people with whom he was dealing. Given the Iroquois practice of incorporating defeated peoples into their communities and their efforts to form alliances with others, they hardly needed his advice about the wisdom of peace and alliance formation. Moreover, his comments on the fur trade reflect an ignorance of its workings. He evidently was not informed of the fur shortage experienced by tribes on the Great Lakes, nor from where the Iroquois

procured most of their pelts. Theirs came from the north shore of Lake Ontario, land claimed by the Iroquois and not by the Ottawas, Illinois, and Miamis.<sup>78</sup> It was because these areas were their major hunting grounds that the Iroquois opposed so vehemently the building of Forts Frontenac and later Detroit, and it was, in part, because these lands were excellent hunting and trapping areas that the French wanted to build forts in these places in the first place.<sup>79</sup> Indeed, the French used the lure of hunting there to encourage the upper tribes to relocate to the vicinity of both installations.<sup>80</sup>

Despite all this, the Iroquois agreed with much of what Bellomont proposed, although they ignored his remarks about the trapping potential of their lands. They promised to uphold the Covenant Chain, to trade at Albany, to consider peace with the Western Indians, and to accept ministers in their villages. Bellomont, however, did not respond to a pivotal request from the Iroquois that concerned the security of their land. "Wee desire that our Brother Corlaer the Earl of Bellomont would write to the Great King of England, that the limitts and bounds may be establish'd between Us and the French of Canada to prevent all disputes and controversies, that each may know their bounds when wee are upon our own land and when wee are upon the French King's land."<sup>81</sup>

While the Iroquois attended their meeting with Governor Bellomont in Albany, a second delegation of their headmen opened peace talks with New France in Montreal. There they told Governor Callière that they spoke for all but the Mohawks.<sup>82</sup> While hunting, the headmen reported, fifty-five of their people had been killed by Western Indians. Forbidden by New York's governor to retaliate, they asked Callière to arrange a peace.<sup>83</sup> Although he expressed interest in their request, Callière dismissed the headmen, ordering them to return to Montreal with all their chiefs. Only then would a treaty be concluded. The meeting would take place in September 1700.<sup>84</sup>

The September meeting between Callière, the Iroquois, and the Western Indians produced a peace treaty despite the absence of several Western Indian tribes. The parties also agreed that the governor would adjudicate any future disputes arising between the Indians. Finally, Callière called upon the Iroquois and all the Western Indians to return to Montreal the following August (1701) to complete the exchange of prisoners and to formalize the peace at a grand treaty council.<sup>85</sup>

An incident that took place during this conference is worth noting. In his speech, the Huron leader *Le Rat* suggested, in rather haughty tones, that the Iroquois would do well to pay more than lip service to the present agreement, unlike they had with former ones.<sup>86</sup> In a show of defiance, and to caution the gathering that although his people had agreed to cease hostili-

ties, they had not lost their nerve, an Iroquois headman blamed the present conflict on the French, who could not be trusted. The governor, he said, “throws his hatchet in the sky, so high that it will never come back, however, he has attached a little rope to this hatchet so that he can retrieve it to strike us with it.”<sup>87</sup> Although the Iroquois were prepared to make peace, they were not so foolish as to let down their guard.

In June 1701 the emissaries Paul Le Moyne de Maricourt and Father Jacques Bruyas appeared at Onondaga, carrying messages from Callière about the upcoming treaty council. When informed of the arrival of the French delegation, Lieutenant Governor John Nanfan immediately dispatched several Albany commissioners to obstruct any diplomatic initiatives the French might take.<sup>88</sup> A messenger from Albany caught up to the commissioners before they reached Onondaga with additional instructions to ask the Iroquois to meet the governor at Albany in thirty days. The Indians’ initial response to Nanfan’s directive was cautious. “They were not a full house and soe could not give a positive answer but as soon as the rest of the Sachims were come, would tell us when they went to Albany and would send a post before.”<sup>89</sup>

With the council at Onondaga convened, the Onondaga headman “De-kanitsore” (Teganissorens) reported the details of his meeting in Montreal with the French governor in the spring of 1701.<sup>90</sup> There Teganissorens had complained to Callière about the newly begun construction of a French fort at Detroit: “You Governour are very unfair, to go about to build a Forte . . . before you acquaint us therewith, I thought you would have told us when you had any such design and desire you doe not proceed with your worke till the middle of summer and then our Sachims will be here when wee will treat about that matter.”<sup>91</sup>

Believing that their aggravation was justified, Callière had attempted to appease the Iroquois, answering that the fort at Detroit was there to supply them “with all necessaries when you are a hunting; powder and lead ettc: and what else you shall want.”<sup>92</sup> At the June 1701 conference at Onondaga, Maricourt would add that the fort was built “to prevent all inconveniences” to the Iroquois, that is, any harassment by the Waganhaes.<sup>93</sup> His statement there was meant to appease Teganissorens, who had told Callière in Montreal: “The Wagannes take our land from us, where wee hunt beaver, lett them hunt upon their own land els wee shall kill one another for the beavers when wee meet together.”<sup>94</sup>

The Iroquois were nonetheless dissatisfied with all the French explanations. “Corlaer tells us wee are Masters of our own land,” argued Teganissorens, “and the Gov<sup>f</sup> of Canada has told us the same, and now

without speaking a word doe you goe and build a Forte att Tjughsaghron die [Detroit].”<sup>95</sup> The Iroquois were clearly annoyed by the temerity of the French to build a fort on lands over which they claimed jurisdiction.

Teganissorens then met privately with the Albany commissioners. He told them that there was considerable division among the Iroquois, much of it linked to religion. But Teganissorens’s real concerns were the fort at Detroit and the threat of renewed warfare with the French.<sup>96</sup> In their response the commissioners were harsh and contemptuous of Teganissorens’s fears; nonetheless, they offered him assurances of the king’s protection.<sup>97</sup>

Teganissorens and the Iroquois, however, had heard all this before. In a history lesson to the commissioners, the Onondaga headman pointedly reminded them that earlier agreements of mutual protection had not been realized: “[We] gott no assistance [from the English] and that makes us afraid what to doe.”<sup>98</sup> Asserting their independence from Albany, which had failed them in its past promises, the Iroquois, through Teganissorens, announced their decision to the assembled French and English representatives.

You both tell us to be Christians, you both make us madd wee know not what side to choose but I will speake no more of praying or Christianity and take the belts down and keep them because you are both to deare with your goods. . . . wee are sorry wee can not pray, but now wee are come to this conclusion those that sells their goods cheapest whether English or French of them will wee have a Minister. . . .

Wee believe the Christians are minded to warr again because the Priest is soe earnest that wee should be newter and sitt still, and wee tell you wee will hold fast to the peace, and if there be any breach itt will be your faults not ours, You must heare us speake before you engage in a warr again.<sup>99</sup>

Teganissorens agreed, in front of New York’s representatives, to Callière’s request that the Iroquois remain neutral in any future conflict between the French and the English.<sup>100</sup> At their spring 1701 meeting in Montreal Callière had replied to Teganissorens’s inquiry about rumors of an impending war between England and France, counseling the Iroquois not to interfere in whatever dispute might arise. “Itt is now peace as long as wee live,” was Callière’s message, according to Teganissorens, “and if there be warr again, lett us fight along [probably “alone”] with your Brother Corlaer.”<sup>101</sup> English efforts to prevent the Iroquois from assuming a neutral stance toward New France had been rejected.

The meetings in Montreal and Albany, to which the Iroquois had been summoned, would take place later that summer in spite of the tense atmo-

sphere. The Iroquois delegations began their preparations for the treaties of 1701.<sup>102</sup>

Proceedings between the Five Nations and the English began in Albany's City Hall on 12 July. The primary goal of this conference was for the parties to stabilize their relationship and to resolve issues outstanding from the contentious June meeting at Onondaga. Representing the English were Lieutenant Governor John Nanfan, Secretary for Indian Affairs Robert Livingston, Peter Schuyler, and other local officials. The Iroquois delegation included nine Mohawk headmen, five Oneidas, twelve Onondagas, four Cayugas, and three Senecas.<sup>103</sup>

Nanfan opened the meeting by announcing that the king had appointed him to succeed the late Earl Bellomont as governor. He then demanded that the Iroquois tell him what had taken place in their June meeting at Onondaga with Maricourt and Bruyas. The governor also asked the Iroquois to report on what progress had been made in negotiations with the Western Indians, "whom the French have soe long imploy'd to kill your people" (897). Nanfan continued, assuring the Iroquois that the Protestant ministers, who in August 1700 Bellomont had promised to send to their villages, were expected "very soon," adding, however, "if you receive a French priest into your country, I must take it as a total defection of your Loyalty to the English Crown." He completed his opening statement by inquiring into the status of those Iroquois who had moved to Canada and were living at the mission of Caughnawaga (897).

The Iroquois speaker Onucheranorum, an Onondaga, replied to the governor two days later. He began by condoling the death of Bellomont, congratulated Nanfan on his appointment, and asked that the governor "be carefull to keep and maintain the covenant chaine firme as the late Gov<sup>r</sup> has done" (898). Onucheranorum, however, moved quickly to the immediate business of the council. In regard to the June meeting at Onondaga with the French, Onucheranorum's answer was blunt and defiant. Nothing had happened that Bellomont's representatives did not already know. If the governor had heard otherwise, Onucheranorum inquired, "wee shall be glad to be informed" (898-99). He then reported that the Iroquois had made peace with seven of the Western Indian tribes, including the Nipissings, Hurons, and Algonquins, and remained at war with six others (*ibid.*).

Nanfan was somewhat more circumspect in the council session that followed. Nonetheless, he voiced his displeasure that the Iroquois had met with Governor Callière, and was especially distressed that they would consider "to sitt still if a warr should happen between us and the French" (900). Furthermore, he thought it "a disparagement to the Five Nations"



that they had complained to the French about the depredations of the “farr Indians” (900). Rather belatedly, he presented the Indians with guns and ammunition “to support and defend yourselv’s” (900).

Nanfan then introduced a new and sensitive topic: the building of the French fort at Detroit, “the principle pass where all your Beaver hunting is” (900).

I am inform’d it is your Land and you have won itt with the sword at the cost of much blood, and will you lett the French take itt from you without one blow. You can never expect to hunt beaver any more in peace if you let them fortife themselves att that principall pass, if you are minded to secure your posterity from slavery and bondage, hinder itt: Remember how they gott Cadarachqui [Fort Frontenac] and what a plague that place has been to you ever since. (900)

Nanfan warned the Iroquois that Callière’s explanation of the purpose of Detroit was an artifice, for with the completion of the fort “he will command you and your beavers too, Nay you shall never hunt a beaver there without his leave” (*ibid.*).

In their negotiations with the Iroquois, the English were anticipating a war with France. Nanfan knew that Callière wanted to neutralize the Iroquois and render useless their alliance with Albany. His intention, therefore, was to keep the Covenant Chain intact. “The great King of England . . . is soe much concern’d for your security,” he told the Iroquois, “that he hath been graciously pleased to give a considerable sum of money to be expended in building a stone Forte here and att Schenectady to defend you from the attempts of an Enemy” (901). Moreover, he encouraged the Iroquois to complete their peacemaking efforts with the Western Indians, thereby drawing their trade to Albany and away from the French. Finally, he admonished the Iroquois to prohibit priests in their villages and to hinder French attempts to build forts in their country (*ibid.*). Only in this way could the Iroquois expect the English to protect them and their hunting lands from the French and their Indian allies. Nanfan plainly wanted the Iroquois and the French to remain adversaries, just as the French wanted the Iroquois to remain at odds with their western allies.

In their negotiations with Nanfan, Iroquois strategy was to maintain good relations with the English but to avoid jeopardizing the neutrality recently established with the French or severing their diplomatic ties to Montreal. They needed the French to craft a peace with all the Western Indians, thereby safeguarding their hunting territories north and west of Lakes Erie and Ontario and providing the time to regroup, if necessary, for a war with New France.

On 19 July, the fourth day of the conference, the Iroquois gave Nanfan their reply. They admitted that the French had encroached on their lands and built a fort at Detroit without their consent. Although the Iroquois were agreeable to extending the Covenant Chain to the Western Indians, the French now at Detroit “would mock at itt” (905). Thus the Iroquois fully expected the English to act on their promises of protection and remove the French presence (904–5). “If the French make any attempts or come into our country to delude us,” the Iroquois spokesman added, “wee desire you to send men of wisdom and understanding to countermine them, for they [are] to subtile and cunning for us, and if you can convince them, that will be a means to stop their designs and soe prevent their ill intentions” (905).<sup>104</sup>

Pursuing this line of reasoning, and once again trying to pressure the English to act, the Iroquois took an unexpected tack.<sup>105</sup> They first asked Nanfan to send Robert Livingston, “our Secretary,” to England to inform the Crown of French encroachments on Iroquois territory, including the building of Fort Detroit. Furthermore, they wanted Livingston to petition the king to “use all means to prevent itt, else wee shall be tyed upp, wee shall not be able to live, they will come nearer us every day with their Forts” (905).<sup>106</sup> What happened next, however, was a surprise. The Iroquois made an offer they believed would thwart the French threat.

Wee doe give and render up all that land where the Beaver hunting is which wee won with the sword eighty years ago to Coraghkoo our great King [the King of England] and pray that he may be our protector and defender there and desire our secretary may write an instrument which wee will signe and seale, that itt may be carried by him to the King, wee fear if he does not goe, there is soe much business, this will be only read layd aside and forgott, but if he goes wee are sure, wee shall have an answer. (ibid.)

The instrument that Livingston drafted was the “Deed from the Five Nations to the King of their Beaver Hunting Ground,” dated 19 July 1701.<sup>107</sup> It was signed by three Seneca headmen, six Mohawks, three Cayugas, five Onondagas, and three Oneidas. Nanfan was the English signatory to the deed, which was “sealed and delivered in the presence of” its author, Robert Livingston, the mayor of Albany, the city’s aldermen, the high sheriff, a justice, the interpreters, and several other individuals (908–11).

The preamble to the 1701 deed states that the ancestors of the “five nations or Cantons of Indians,” had fought a “fierce and bloody warr with seaven nations of Indians called the Aragaritkas” and had defeated them “four score years agoe,” driving them from their homeland. Aragaritkas is one of several Iroquois references to the Hurons and the Huron Con-

federacy, but the “seven nations” noted here include the Eries, Neutrals, Wenros, Petuns (Tionondade), the Mascoutens (also, Asistagueronon, Atsistaehronon, or “Fire Nation”), that is, the Algonquians of Michigan’s Lower Peninsula and other Indian groups attacked and dispersed by the Iroquois in the seventeenth century.<sup>108</sup>

The land described in the deed is located generally north of Lake Erie and the western end of Lake Ontario.

The land scituate lyeing and being northwest and by west from Albany beginning on the south west side of Cadarachqui lake<sup>109</sup> and includes all that waste Tract of Land lyeing between the great lake off Ottowawa [Lake Huron] and the lake called by the natives Sahiquage and by the Christians the lake of Swege<sup>110</sup> and runns till it butts upon the Twichtwicks<sup>111</sup> and is bounded on the right hand by a place called Quadoge<sup>112</sup> conteigning in length about eight hundred miles and in bredth four hundred miles including the country where the bevers the deers, Elks and such beasts keep and the place called Tieugsachrondio, alias Fort de Tret [Detroit] or wawyachtenok and so runs round the lake of swege till you come to [the] place called Oniadarondaquat<sup>113</sup> which is about twenty miles from the Sinnekes [Senecas] Castles.<sup>114</sup>

A second description more clearly defines the boundary of the “land or Colony called Canagariarchio,” earlier referred to as the “waste Tract of Land” between Lake Huron and Lake Erie.<sup>115</sup> This area is said to begin on the “northwest side of Cadarachqui lake” and encompasses “that vast tract of land” between the “great lake of Ottawawa” and the “lake of Swege.” It is bordered on “the westward by the Twichtwicks,” where beavers and “all sorts of wild game keeps,” and “which [was] formerly posest by seven nations of Indians called Aragaritka,” and is said to include Niagara Falls.<sup>116</sup>

The homelands of the Indians defeated or dispersed by the Iroquois in the seventeenth century serve to define the territory described in the 1701 deed. The Huron tribal or settlement area was located between Lake Simcoe and the southeast shore of Georgian Bay. Southwest of the Hurons and directly south of Georgian Bay were the Petuns. The Neutrals and Wenros controlled the areas west and southwest of Lake Ontario, and the Eries occupied the region southeast of Lake Erie. The Mascoutens (Asistagueronons, Atsistaehronon) inhabited Michigan’s Lower Peninsula.<sup>117</sup>

A contemporary description of the area is as follows. The boundary of the lands described in the 1701 deed begins on the northwest side of Lake Ontario in the vicinity of present-day Toronto and the mouth of the Humber River. The Dowaganhaes had indicated to the Iroquois in June 1700 that they wished to settle in this locale, “on y<sup>e</sup> North side of Cadarachqui

Lake near Tchojachiage.”<sup>118</sup> As these Indians had requested permission to move into the area, it is assumed that they would establish their villages only on land controlled indisputably by the Iroquois.

The eastern border is marked by a line drawn from the starting point at Toronto, running generally north along the western edge of Lake Simcoe, to the northwestern end of Lake Couchiching. From here it shifts direction to the west-northwest, following the height of land marking the southern edge of the drainage of the North River west to Matchedash Bay. The border passes north of historic Huronia located in northern Simcoe County and on the Saugeen Peninsula. Included are Île Ondiatana (Giant’s Tomb Island), Île Ascensionis (Beckwith Island), Hope Island, Île Gahoendoe (Christian Island), and those islands lying immediately off the Saugeen Peninsula.<sup>119</sup> The boundary then turns south to follow the western side of the Saugeen Peninsula, past the outlets of the Saugeen, Maitland, and Au Sable Rivers, to the mouth of the St. Clair River near Detroit. It then follows the shore of Lake Huron north, around Saginaw Bay to the northern tip of Michigan’s Lower Peninsula and the Straits of Mackinac. From here it traces the western limits of Michigan’s Lower Peninsula south to the head of the lake and the Calumet River. The boundary shifts direction again and tracks generally east to the western end of Lake Erie. It runs around the south shore of the lake, and reaching the lake’s southeastern point, follows a line east toward the Genesee River and the western boundary of Seneca country.<sup>120</sup>

By the 1701 deed, the Iroquois “conveyed” to the English all the lands described above. In return the English agreed to protect the Iroquois in their “use” of this land. “It is thereby expected that wee are to have free hunting for us and the heires and descendants from us the Five Nations for ever and that free of all disturbances expecting to be protected therein by the Crown of England.”<sup>121</sup>

With the matter of the 1701 deed concluded, several important details remained to be discussed at the Albany meeting. The Iroquois asked Nanfan that goods at Albany “be sold as cheap as formerly,” claiming that the French offered better prices, “which draws our people” to Montreal.<sup>122</sup> The Iroquois did not want to lose their economic ties to Albany, yet a related motive for raising this issue may have been to encourage the Western Indians to bring their furs to this English settlement and not to the French at Montreal.

The Iroquois voiced again their uneasiness about the French threat. Their spokesman proposed to Nanfan that “if a warr should break out between us and the French, wee desire you to come and stay here in this place [Albany], that you may be ready to assist and defend us.”<sup>123</sup> The Iroquois also agreed to receive Protestant ministers and not French priests. “The

French priests have been the ruine of our Country and therefore [we] have no cause to suffer them any more.”<sup>124</sup>

The Iroquois repeated their fears with respect to the security of their hunting lands, fears that they had brought to the attention of Bellomont in August 1700, and they questioned the resolve of the English to furnish them assistance in their conflict with the French.<sup>125</sup>

The Govern<sup>r</sup> of Canada has sent a party of men who are gone behind our Country privately to build a Forte att Tjughsaghrondie [Detroit]. . . . Wee thought this Govern<sup>t</sup> [the English] would have done something in the matter and to have found you busy in your books and mapps (meaning that the line should be run between the two Govern<sup>ts</sup>) wee can doe nothing in that case you know, wee have not power to resist such a Christian enemy, therefore wee must depend upon you Brother Corlaer to take this case in hand and acquaint the great King with itt for what will become of us att this rate where shall wee hunt a beaver if the French of Canada take possession of our beaver country.<sup>126</sup>

On 21 July five of the Iroquois’ “principal Sachims” met privately with Governor Nanfan.<sup>127</sup> This apparently brief meeting dealt with two pressing issues: the return of prisoners and the French threat to Iroquois hunting grounds.

The Iroquois were especially troubled that the French still held a large number of their people “upon pretence to make them Christians.” They asked Nanfan to “pray see to gett our people here to this town [Albany] and when they are gott soe farr the Ministers here will instruct them in the Christian Religion which will be a means that they will at last return to their own country again.”<sup>128</sup> And they restated their anxieties over land. Still, the Iroquois’ chief grievance was the failure of the English to provide them military aid.<sup>129</sup>

There is no doubt of the intentions of the Iroquois in their “conveyance” of Indian land under the 1701 deed. This was a bold move made to draw out and compel the English to protect them against the French and their Indian allies, thus guaranteeing the Iroquois continued and unimpeded access to their vital hunting territories.<sup>130</sup>

Osgood argues that Livingston’s “ambitious views concerning the west” were behind the purpose of the 1701 deed, suggesting that the conveyance by the Indians of this huge tract of land, situated as it was south of a boundary line Livingston contemplated, would only strengthen English sovereign claims in any negotiations with the French.<sup>131</sup> Richter echoes Osgood’s views, maintaining that Iroquois leaders “clearly expected the English king to use the paper they granted him in negotiations with the French

crown over boundaries in North America” while acknowledging that “the transaction symbolically sealed a reinterpreted Covenant Chain and firmly placed the Iroquois under English ‘protection’ from the French.”<sup>132</sup>

According to Trelease, however, the chief significance of the 1701 deed was only symbolic, that the English “were no more able to exercise control in that vast area than before the deed was executed.” The French, of course, refused to recognize it. Moreover, the Indians had no intention of opening this territory to English settlement, nor would they surrender their hunting rights there.<sup>133</sup> They simply wanted a commitment from the English for military aid to counter the threats of the French and their Indian allies, which, not incidentally, would also serve to protect their hunting territories. “Nanfan and his successors had ample opportunity to discover, as had Livingston and others already, that the Five Nations still regarded themselves as an independent entity.”<sup>134</sup>

The “grand treaty council” between the Iroquois and New France took place in Montreal in July and August 1701.<sup>135</sup> Iroquois objectives were to reaffirm the commitment to peace they had made the previous year, to extend the peace to those tribes not present at the initial peace settlement, and most importantly, to resolve the matter of Fort Detroit and secure their hunting lands north of Lake Ontario.

The Onondagas, Oneidas, and Cayugas were the first to arrive at Montreal. They were soon followed by Indian allies of the French, traveling in about two hundred canoes (200).<sup>136</sup> Over one thousand Indians would eventually assemble on the St. Lawrence, including the Iroquois, the Ottawas, Wyandots, Winnebagos, Sauks, Potawatomis, Miamis, Mascoutens, Nipissings, Foxes, Ojibwas, and others (239–40).<sup>137</sup>

The formal meetings with Governor Callière began on 25 July. Hunting and the fur trade were common themes in many of the opening speeches. Addressing Callière, Outoutaga, an Ottawa headman, asked that his people be excused “if we make you so little a present . . . [but] we have destroyed and eaten [depleted] all the land. There are at present few beavers, and we cannot hunt except for Bears, for raccoons, and for other small peltry” (203). A second Ottawa headman reported that “beaver began to be rare, and asked that their small peltry be accepted” (204), and a Potawatomi chief asked that pity be taken upon them and that they receive good prices for their furs “because they had few beavers” (207).

The lament that beavers were scarce was repeated by many of the Western Indians. Onaganiouitak, headman of the Nipissings, explained the resentment he apparently harbored toward some of the Ottawas: “[They] have the advantage of spreading themselves [i.e., ranging] everywhere to

kill beavers, which allows them to have many; but as for those who are restricted to their [own] lands, they have destroyed all [of the beaver]" (221). Callière cautioned these Indians that if they continued the "wanton destruction of animals," they risked famine. He advised them to follow the example of the Abenakis of St. Francis, who had turned from hunting to farming (221-22).

The beaver shortage in the territories of the Western Indians is of considerable significance. It helps to explain why in the previous year the Dowaganhaes had asked the Iroquois for permission to settle on the north side of Lake Ontario, to share hunting territories, and to trade in Albany.<sup>138</sup> Simply put, many of the Western Indians had either depleted the local supply of beavers or were dangerously close to doing so. Without beavers there could be no trade. A peace with the Iroquois, no matter how unpalatable, that offered the possibility of access to their hunting territories had become a serious option, energized, in part, by the now-strained relations between the French and the Western Indians.

Disputes over the return of prisoners occupied a substantial part of the treaty proceedings. They were generally resolved, however, by 4 August, the day of the "General Meeting." Indians from some thirty tribes and bands, along with the "people of quality" from Montreal, were present as Callière opened the council (239-41). In his speech the governor noted that it was less than a year since the Hurons and Ottawas had concluded peace with the Iroquois. He urged that it now be ratified by all the Indian nations allied to New France (240). Expressing his joy that the Indians had gathered at Montreal, he took away their hatchets and put them in a deep trench so that no one could retrieve them. Callière urged them to reach a consensus concerning their hunting to avoid conflicts that would jeopardize the peace.<sup>139</sup> He concluded by restating the commitment he had made to the Western Indians and the Iroquois in September 1700: that he would resolve any future disputes that might arise between the Indians (241).

The Iroquois responded to Callière's speech: "Ontontio . . . we are delighted at all that you have done, and we have listened to what you have said, in recognition of which here are our words (gave four wampum belts) to assure you that we will adhere firmly to your requests" (252).

On 7 August 1701 the Iroquois and the governor met a final time. Callière told the Iroquois of his meeting with the Western Indians, who had assured him that they would hold to everything they had promised in their public meetings. He then offered to return all the Iroquois prisoners the Western Indians had surrendered to him, excepting five. These the governor would retain until the Iroquois had returned with the captives they possessed (263). With the exchange of prisoners completed, Callière announced to the Iroquois: "This winter you can hunt together peacefully" (264).

Callière returned to the topic of Detroit, telling the Iroquois that the fort would remain where it was. He assured the Indians, however, that “should some misunderstanding develop during the time when you are hunting there with others . . . the commander that is there can protect you and arrange matters, and he will inform me; as did he from Fort Frontenac last winter . . . , as well, when you want to go to the fort at [Detroit] you will be well received and find merchandise at a reasonable price” (264).

Callière also secured from the four Iroquois tribes the promise of neutrality made by Teganissorens earlier that year.<sup>140</sup> He advised them to “sit peacefully upon your mats, and not take part in our misunderstanding, because otherwise you will be engaged again in war with me and all my allies, who will block up the road from you[r villages] to here, and in all your settlements, which are presently open for you to come and find your necessities” (265).

“We thank you for the settlement that you have made at [Detroit],” the Iroquois responded, “because, going to hunt in these parts, we will be well pleased to find our needs [met]” (266). Importantly, they repeated their promise to remain neutral in the event of an imperial struggle. “We will make known to the Mohawks,” they concluded, “as you have recommended to us to, and we will tell them of the chagrin we feel that we did not find them here with us” (266). The 1701 treaty council at Montreal was concluded.

Had the Iroquois met all their objectives? Certainly they had broadened the scope of the peace by including far more native signatories than they had originally intended. They had also come to terms with the presence of Fort Detroit: it would provide trade goods and arms, and serve to regulate relations with French native allies hunting on the north shores of Lakes Ontario and Erie. But how well had the Iroquois secured their interests in that territory? Had they reached the consensus over hunting rights that Callière had wanted? The answer is yes. At a meeting with an Iroquois who had come to complain about French-allied Indians hunting near Fort Frontenac, an area the Iroquois claimed as their own, Callière’s advice was that they should all view themselves as brothers and “reach some agreement about hunting because peace is made and the land is united.”<sup>141</sup> In light of earlier Iroquois acceptance of Western Indian relocations to the north shore of Lake Ontario, this can only mean a shared hunting territory, in this case, in the vicinity of Fort Frontenac.

One or two other factors lead to the conclusion that some arrangement over hunting was a part of the overall accord. In his opening speech at the July 1701 Montreal conference Callière stressed the need for a hunting agreement. At another point he explained that one benefit of Fort Detroit, like that of Fort Frontenac, would be to assist in settling disputes that arose



as the Iroquois and New France's Indian allies hunted together. In both instances the Iroquois confirmed Callière's statements. As the Iroquois would report almost two decades later, they had "partition[ed] the hunting places between us and the French Indians."<sup>142</sup> This can only mean that the Iroquois agreed to share what they considered their land.

The French, of course, would not concede that the lands in question belonged to the Iroquois. This was an impossibility in the face of any hopes they held of besting the English in claiming the west for themselves. But the fact that the French acknowledged that their forts on these lands would anger the Iroquois meant, at the very least, that they also recognized Iroquois claims to those lands. That colonial officials tried to appease the Iroquois, and moreover, agreed to control their native allies in order not to provoke the Iroquois, is acknowledgment of both the power of the Iroquois and the legitimacy of their claims—even if they could not admit to the latter.

Thus, from the point of view of the Iroquois, by 1701 their diplomatic goals had been realized. Any further attacks by the French and their allies had been averted by allowing them to hunt on Iroquois lands. The Iroquois had also gained access to another source of trade goods and guns at nearby Detroit. These were both important achievements, considering the rather unreliable military relationship between the Iroquois and the English.

The French, of course, had gained another fort in Iroquois territory, but this happened only in return for ensuring that their allies would not harm the Iroquois. Moreover, their now ready access to French Indian allies and strong trade links to Albany presented the Iroquois with new opportunities to draw other "far Indians" into their network of alliances and away from that of New France. They had even managed to maneuver the English into a position where they had something to gain in preventing further French encroachments on Iroquois lands.<sup>143</sup> And if the peace failed, there would likely be an opportunity for the Iroquois to more aggressively assert their rights. At least, this had always been the case. Peace for the Iroquois, after all, was simply a respite from war, not its abolishment.

## Notes

We are grateful to Conrad E. Heidenreich, who read and offered helpful criticisms on a section of an early draft of the manuscript. He also furnished us with a base map of the region in question and made available copies of the Mitchell and Evans maps. Sharon Kuromiya produced the final version of the map used in this essay.

1 See, for example, Leroy V. Eid, "The Ojibwa-Iroquois War: The War the Five Nations Did Not Win," *Ethnohistory* 26 (1979): 297–324; Gilles Havard, *La*

- Grande Paix de Montréal de 1701: Les Voies de la diplomatie franco-amérindienne* (Montreal, 1992), 66, 67, 163, 172; Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* (New York, 1984), 207–10; Peter S. Schmalz, *The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario* (Toronto, 1991); and Donald B. Smith, “Who Are the Mississauga?” *Ontario History* 7, no. 4 (1975): 211–22.
- 2 The 1701 treaties in Albany and Montreal are addressed in varying detail in a number of secondary sources. See Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century*, vol. 1 (New York, 1924), 474–76; Anthony F. C. Wallace, “Origins of Iroquois Neutrality: The Grand Settlement of 1701,” *Pennsylvania History* 24, no. 3 (1957): 223–35; Allen Trelease, *Indian Affairs in Colonial New York: The Seventeenth Century* (Ithaca, NY, 1960), 361–63; Richard L. Haan, “The Covenant Chain: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Niagara Frontier, 1697–1730” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1976), 128–47; Haan, “The Problem of Iroquois Neutrality: Suggestions for Revision,” *Ethnohistory* 27 (1980): 317–30; Richard Aquila, *The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier, 1701–1754* (Detroit, MI, 1983), 59–69; Havard, *La Grande Paix de Montréal*; Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 210–13; Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992), 210–13.
  - 3 Hindsight reveals that the Iroquois never regained the military dominance they enjoyed for most of the seventeenth century. But this was not inevitable, nor were the English, French, or Iroquois omniscient about what the future held. It was the fear of Iroquois power that pushed the French to try to neutralize these Indians.
  - 4 Conrad E. Heidenreich, “The Great Lakes Basin, 1600–1653,” in *Historical Atlas of Canada*, vol. 1, ed. R. Cole Harris (Toronto, 1987), pl. 35; Lucien Campeau, *Catastrophe démographique sur les grands lacs: Les Premiers Habitants du Québec* (Montreal, 1986).
  - 5 See Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*; J. A. Brandão, “‘Your fyre shall burn no more’: Iroquois Policy toward New France and Her Native Allies to 1701” (Ph.D. diss., York University, 1994).
  - 6 Heidenreich, “Inland Expansion,” in *Historical Atlas of Canada*, vol. 1, ed. R. Cole Harris (Toronto, 1987), 86; W. J. Eccles, *Canada under Louis XIV, 1663–1701* (Toronto, 1978), 39–44.
  - 7 Louis-Armand de Lom D’Arce de Lahontan, *New Voyages to North America*, 2 vols., ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites (1703; rpt. Chicago, 1905), 1: 323.
  - 8 E. B. O’Callaghan, ed., “Narrative of Governor de Courcelles’ Voyage to Lake Ontario, 1671,” *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York: Procured in Holland, England, and France, by John Romeyn Brodhead*, 15 vols. (Albany, NY, 1853–87), 9:80 (hereafter cited as NYCD). See also M. Talon to the King, 10 November 1670, NYCD 9:64–65.
  - 9 Victor Konrad, “An Iroquois Frontier: The North Shore of Lake Ontario during the Late Seventeenth Century,” *Journal of Historical Geography* 7, no. 2 (1981): 133, 137; Heidenreich, “Expansion of French Trade, 1667–1696,” in *Historical Atlas of Canada*, vol. 1, ed. R. Cole Harris (Toronto, 1987), pl. 38. From all indications, the Iroquois began a withdrawal from these villages

- about 1687. They were eventually replaced by the Ottawas, Mississaugas, and possibly other refugee groups drawn to the north shore of Lake Ontario by trade, a general peace with the Iroquois, and the depletion of beavers and other animals in their homelands (Konrad, "Iroquois Frontier," 142; M. de Denonville to M. de Seignelay, 25 August 1687, NYCD 9:341; Charles le Roy, Bacqueville de la Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4 vols. [1722; Paris, 1753], 4:203).
- 10 M. Talon to the King, 10 November 1670, NYCD 9:65.
  - 11 Eccles, *Canada under Louis XIV*, 59–76.
  - 12 La Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:179.
  - 13 Voyage de Monsieur le comte de Frontenac au Lac Ontario en 1673, Archives Nationales, Paris, Archives des Colonies, series C11A, 4:12–24 (hereafter cited as AN, C11A).
  - 14 Eccles, *Canada under Louis XIV*, 106–8.
  - 15 Brandão, "Iroquois Policy toward New France," 298–312.
  - 16 Abstract of the Proposals submitted by two Iroquois Nations, 2 August 1684, NYCD 3:347; Conference, October 1683, NYCD 14:772; Answer of the Five Nations to Governor Dongan, 6 August 1687, NYCD 3:442; Governor Dongan to the Lord President, 19 February 1687, NYCD 3:510.
  - 17 Brandão, "Iroquois Policy toward New France," 94–131, 174–97; Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 40 (1983): 528–59; William A. Starna and Ralph Watkins, "Northern Iroquoian Slavery," *Ethnohistory* 38 (1991): 34–57.
  - 18 Brandão, "Iroquois Policy toward New France," 300–2.
  - 19 Eccles, *France in America*, rev. ed. (East Lansing, MI, 1990), 91–92.
  - 20 Brandão, "Iroquois Policy toward New France," 242–47. See also a chronology of the raids for the period 1670 to 1701 in appendix D, table D.1, pp. 470–508 of this work.
  - 21 [Anon.], *Memoire pour Eclaircir la dispositions dans les quelles Monsieur le Comte de Frontenac a l'aisse le Canada a l'Egard des Sauvages et principalment des Iroquois*, [1682], AN, C11A, 6:21; De Meulles au Ministre, 12 November 1682, AN, C11A, 6:85.
  - 22 Jean de Lamberville to Gov. Frontenac, 20 September 1682, in *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, 1610–1791*, 73 vols., ed. R. G. Thwaites (1896–1901; rpt. New York, 1959), 62:153; [Gov. La Barre], *Dans l'assemblee tenue 10 octobre, 1682 . . .*, AN, C11A, 6:68–70; Lahontan, *New Voyages*, 1:395; Louis Henri de Baugy, *Journal d'une expedition contre les Iroquois en 1687* (Paris, 1883), 50–52.
  - 23 Cadwallader Colden, *The History of the Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province of New-York in America* (Ithaca, NY, 1958), 48.
  - 24 Ibid.
  - 25 Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 151–52; Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 183–84; Elisabeth Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual," in *Handbook of North American Indians*, ed. Bruce G. Trigger, vol. 15, *Northeast* (Washington, DC, 1978), 432 (hereafter cited as HNAI); cf. Gov. Dongan to M. De La Barre, 24 June 1684 and July 1684, in *The Documentary History of the State of New-York, Arranged under the Direction of the Hon. Christopher Morgan, Secretary of State*, quarto ed., 4 vols., ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (Albany, NY, 1850–51), 1:68–69 (hereafter cited as DHNY).

- 26 Eccles, *France in America*, 97–98; Presens des onontaguez faits a Onontio, 5 September 1684, AN, CIIA, 6:299–300.
- 27 Abstract of the Proposals of the Onoundages and Cayouges Sachems at New York, 2 August 1684, DHNY I:263; Abstract of the Proposals submitted by two Iroquois Nations, 2 August 1684, NYCD 3:347; see also DHNY I:259–65.
- 28 Helen Broshar, “The First Push Westward of the Albany Traders,” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 7, no. 3 (December 1920): 228–41; Arthur H. Buffinton, “The Policy of Albany and English Westward Expansion,” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 8, no. 4 (March 1922): 327–66.
- 29 Brandão, “Iroquois Policy toward New France,” 317–19.
- 30 [Anon., la marche de Denonville contre les Iroquois], 16 July 1687, AN, CIIA, 9:32–38; Denonville au Ministre, 25 August 1687, AN, CIIA, 9:61–77; Memoire du Voyage Pour L’Entreprise de M. Le Marquis De Denonville Contre les Sonontouans . . . , Denonville, [October 1687], AN, CIIA, 9:104–20; Baugy, *Journal d’une expedition*. See also Eccles, *Frontenac: The Courtier Governor* (Toronto, 1959), 173–85.
- 31 Brandão, “Iroquois Policy toward New France,” appendix D, table D.I, 484–88; Eccles, *Frontenac*, 186–97.
- 32 Relation de ce qui s’est passe en Canada . . . [September 1692–November 1693], AN, CIIA, 12:185–91; Champigny, Relation . . . au sujet de la guerre . . . , 17 August 1693, AN, CIIA, 12:256–58.
- 33 Eccles, *France in America*, 103.
- 34 Eccles, *Frontenac*, 207–8.
- 35 In 1692 a Mohawk headman upbraided the English for their inaction: “You Sett us on dayly to fight & destroy your Enemies [the French] & bidd us goe on wth Courage, but wee See not y<sup>t</sup> you doe anything to it yourSelfs” (Lawrence H. Leder, ed., *The Livingston Indian Records, 1666–1723* [Gettysburg, PA, 1956], 165). The English recognized that their disunity and military weakness were responsible for pushing some Iroquois to consider peace with the French (Council Minutes, 17 August 1692, *Journal of the Legislative Council of New York* [1691–1743] [Albany, NY, 1861], 18 [hereafter cited as LCNy]; Council Minutes, 22 March 1693, LCNy, 54; Governor Fletcher to the Committee of Trade and Plantations, 28 March 1694, NYCD 4:84–85; Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, 13 April 1699, NYCD 4:487).
- 36 Relation . . . [1695–1696], AN, CIIA, 14:48–60; Frontenac et Champigny au Ministre, 26 August 1696, AN, CIIA, 14:119–20; Eccles, *Frontenac*, 264–66.
- 37 “We are not able of ourselves to destroy them [the French],” Sanonguirese, a Mohawk headman reported to New York’s Governor Fletcher in 1696. “We are become a small people and much lessened by warr” (Journal of Governor Fletcher’s Visit to Albany, 1 October 1696, NYCD 4:237).
- 38 Brandão, “Iroquois Policy toward New France,” 323–25.
- 39 See the speech of Sanonguirese, [Conference, 1–3 October 1696], NYCD 4:237, 240.
- 40 Two years before the Treaty of Ryswick was concluded, the Iroquois had made it clear where they stood on the issue of sovereignty: “You thinke your selves the ancient inhabitants of this countrey & longest in possession yea all the Christian Inhabitant’s of New York & Cayenquiragoé [New York’s governor] thinke the same of themselves Wee Warriours are the firste & the ancient people & the greatest of You all, these part’s and country’s were inhabited

and trodd upon by us the warriour's before any Christian" (Message from the Governor of Canada to the Five Nations, and Their Answer, 4 February 1695, NYCD 4:122).

- 41 Eccles, *Frontenac*, 260–61.
- 42 [Conference], 22 January 1690, in Colden, *History of the Five Indian Nations*, 95ff.); Council Minutes, 11 December 1693, LCNy 7:36; Journal of Major Dirck Wessel's Embassy to Onondaga, [August 1693], NYCD 4:59–63; Propositions of the Five Nations . . . , [2–9 February], 1694, NYCD 4:85–87; Message from the Governor of Canada to the Five Nations and their Answer, [31 January to 4 February], 1695, NYCD 4:120–22; Propositions made by the [Onondagas], 4 June 1697, NYCD 4:279. The French were convinced that Iroquois considerations of these peace offers were merely tactics to buy time to better prepare for war (Champigny au Ministre, 6 November 1695, AN, C11A, 13:360; Callière au ministre, 16 October 1700, AN, C11A, 18:63–71; La Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:188–89).
- 43 Vaudreuil au ministre, 8 November 1711, *Rapporte de l'archiviste de la province de Québec*, 1946–47, 453.
- 44 Eccles, *Frontenac*, 282–84.
- 45 Frontenac et Champigny au Ministre, 26 October 1696, AN, C11A, 14:121.
- 46 *Ibid.*, 120.
- 47 Eccles, *Frontenac*, 285–86, 289–90.
- 48 Answer of the Five Nations to the Earl of Bellomont's Message, 9 May 1699, NYCD 4:565.
- 49 See, for example, Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, 17 April 1699, 3 May 1699, and 28 February 1699 [1700], NYCD 4:504–5, 513, 609–10.
- 50 Journal of Benjamin Bullivant . . . , [13 February to 19 May], 1690, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies*, ed. W. Sainsbury et al. (London, 1896–), 13:264. These complaints led to renewed requests by the king for the other colonies to contribute more to the war effort. But while some colonies were offended by the Iroquois' charges, little concrete help was forthcoming (see [Board of Trade to Nicholson], 2 September 1697, *Archives of Maryland*, ed. W. H. Browne et al. [Annapolis, MD, 1883–1906], 23:207–12; Robert Treat and Council to . . . Fitz John Winthrop, 12 November 1696, *Collections of the Connecticut Historical Society*, ed. Charles Hoadly et al. [Hartford, CT, 1869–1960], 24:126–27 [hereafter cited as CCHS]; Fitz John Winthrop to King William, [n.d.], CCHS, 24:128–29).
- 51 This latter point is addressed below.
- 52 Answer of the Five Nations . . . , 2 June 1691, NYCD 3:774–77; [Albany Conference, 13–14 June 1699], NYCD 4:572.
- 53 [Minutes of Indian Affairs], 23 August 1699, in Peter Wraaxall, *An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs, Contained in Four Folio Volumes, Transacted in the Colony of New York from the Year 1678 to the Year 1751* (New York, 1968), 33; Council Minutes, LCNy 8, pt. 1:131.
- 54 Answer of the Five Nations . . . , 9 May 1699, NYCD 4:564.
- 55 La Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:163; Negotiation of the Commissioners sent . . . to Onondaga, [9 April to 2 May], 1700, NYCD 4:655, 657, 658, 660.
- 56 Instructions for the Earl of Bellomont, 31 August 1697, NYCD 4:290. Land swindles by officials appointed to act on behalf of the colonial government had

- already upset the Iroquois (see Fraudulent Purchase of Land from the Mohawk Indians, 31 May 1698, NYCD 4:345-47; [Richard Coote], *Propositions made by the Five Nations of Indians viz. the Mahagues, Oneydes, Onmondagas, Cayouges and Sinmekes, to his Excellency Richard Earl of Bellomont, Capt. General and Governour in chief of his Majesties Province of New-York etc.* [New York, 1698], 3-4).
- 57 Cayuga speaker, Conference, 5 May 1750, NYCD 10:206. See also Wraxall, Some thoughts on the British Indian Interests . . . , [1755], NYCD 7:18.
- 58 The Iroquois factions during this period are usually designated “pro-French” or “pro-British.” Richter has applied the terms “Francophiles” and “Anglo-philés” (*Ordeal of the Longhouse*). All these labels miss a central point. The divisions among the Iroquois did not result from disagreements between those who supported or admired either the French or the British. Instead, they can be traced to those Iroquois who supported a continued war, or at least opposed a formal peace with New France, and those who favored an end to hostilities. The Iroquois factions were, in fact, *pro-Iroquois*. They could not, however, agree on a policy that would best serve the interests of the individual Iroquois tribes and the Confederacy.
- 59 Eid, “Ojibwa-Iroquois War,” and Schmalz, *Ojibwa of Southern Ontario*, 13-34 (n. 1), argue for a series of devastating defeats of Iroquois forces by the Ojibwas that are alleged to have taken place from the late 1670s to about 1700, resulting in the expulsion of the Iroquois from Ontario. The conclusions drawn by both authors, however, are based on oral traditions published in the mid- to late nineteenth century that remain unconfirmed by the documentary record (see Brandão, “Iroquois Policy toward New France,” appendix D, table D.1, 470-508).
- 60 Note, for example, the efforts to induce the Hurons, Ottawas, Ojibwas, Mississaugas, and the Iroquois living on the reserves in New France to make peace with the Five Nations and to relocate to Iroquoia ([Conference], 3 February 1690, Wraxall, *Indian Affairs*, 15; [Conference], 22 January 1690, Colden, *History of the Five Indian Nations*, 95ff.; Anon., Relation de ce que s’est passé de plus Considerable En Canada . . . , [1690 to 1691], AN, C11A, 11:46; Champigny au Ministre, 10 May 1691, AN, C11A, 11:256; Père Bruyas a Frontenac, 4 April 1691, AN, C11E, 10:9-11; Callière au Ministre, 19 October 1694, AN, C11A, 13:105; Frontenac et Champigny au Ministre, 10 November 1695, AN, C11A, 13:296).
- 61 Ottawas, Ojibwas, or often, generalized western Algonquians.
- 62 NYCD 4:694. The “Covenant Chain” is the name of a confederation, first formed in 1677, that consisted of the Five Nations and their Indian allies on one hand, and New York and other English colonies, and sometimes the French, on the other (Francis Jennings, ed., *The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and Their League* [Syracuse, NY, 1985], 116).
- 63 NYCD 4:695. English officials in Albany learned of the proceedings at Onondaga through the Oneidas and immediately dispatched interpreter Lawrence Claessen [Claese] van der Volgen with orders to encourage the western trade. “If it is possible,” he was told, “bring some of the far nations of Diowagahaes here [Albany] and tell them that they will have powder and lead enough and show them how big the sacks will be. . . . urge the Dawaganhaes to come

- here" (Instructions for Lawrence Claese, 14 June 1700, Leder, *Livingston Indian Records*, 178).
- 64 Richter asserts wrongly, we believe, that at this meeting the Western Indians were there "not to negotiate a treaty, but to impose one," and that as part of the settlement, the Five Nations "surrendered control of the western hunting territories" (*Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 202-3). The Dowaganhaes were not militarily strong enough to *impose* such a policy without French aid, which was not forthcoming. The French sought peace. Nor do the proceedings of this meeting furnish evidence in support of such a claim. In 1960 Trelease concluded: "These Indians, like the Shawnee in 1692, were interested in settling near the Five Nations and trading at Albany. Their intended home was on the north shore of Lake Ontario, in territory which the Iroquois had won by conquest many years before. They could have settled there only by invitation of the Iroquois, and in return for submitting to a satellite position under the confederacy" (*Indian Affairs*, 358). However, these Indians did not move into the area until 1708 (Wraxall, *Indian Affairs*, 52-53, 66).
- 65 La Potherie, *Histoire de l'Amérique septentrionale*, 4:203-4, 207, 221-22.
- 66 Propositions of the Schaghticoke and Five Nations of Indians, &c, 4 July 1693, NYCD 4:45.
- 67 Propositions of the Governor of Canada to some of the Five Nations, 3 July 1700, NYCD 4:696.
- 68 On Iroquois government and its workings see Brandão, "Iroquois Policy toward New France," 64-93.
- 69 The best accounts of French maneuvering during these years come from La Potherie (see La Potherie au Ministre, 16 October 1700, AN, C11A, 18:150-59; La Potherie, *Histoire de l'Amérique septentrionale*, 4:113-266).
- 70 Earl of Bellomont to the Lords of Trade, 17 October 1700, NYCD 4:714.
- 71 Conference of the Earl of Bellomont with the Indians, 26 August 1700, NYCD 4:727ff. The subject of the building of an English fort at Onondaga had been broached the previous April (Negotiations of the Commissioners Sent by the Earl of Bellomont to Onondaga, NYCD 4:660). Iroquois obstructionism, however, frustrated English efforts, and the plans for a fort were abandoned (Colonel Romer's Account of his Visit to Onondaga, 1700, NYCD 4:798-801; Journal of Messrs. Hansen and Van Brugh's Visit to Onondaga, 1700, NYCD 4:806).
- 72 Conference of the Earl of Bellomont with the Indians, 27 August 1700, NYCD 4:729.
- 73 This is not surprising in light of rumors of an English plot to make war against the Iroquois.
- 74 *Ibid.*, 732, 737. The relocation of these Indians, said by the Iroquois to come from "16 Castles," with a population of as many as three to four thousand, did not take place until 1708 (NYCD 4:714; Wraxall, *Indian Affairs*, 52; Conrad E. Heidenreich and Françoise Noël, "Trade and Empire, 1697-1739," in *Historical Atlas of Canada*, vol. 1, ed. R. Cole Harris [Toronto, 1987], pl. 39).
- 75 Conference of the Earl of Bellomont with the Indians, 28 August 1700, NYCD 4:733.
- 76 *Ibid.*, 735.
- 77 *Ibid.*, 735-36.
- 78 Lahontan, *New Voyages*, 1:232; [Anon.], Relation [de ce qui s'est passé en

- Canada, 1695–1696], AN, CIIA, 14:36; Callière et Champigny au Ministre, 18 October 1700, AN, CIIA, 18:3; Colden, *History of the Five Indian Nations*, 181.
- 79 Robert Livingston's Report of his Journey to Onondaga, [April 1700], NYCD 4:650. On the arguments for the French forts see Eccles, *Frontenac*, 79–83; Eccles, *The Canadian Frontier, 1534–1760* (Albuquerque, NM, 1978), 136.
- 80 La Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:254–55.
- 81 Conference of the Earl of Bellomont with the Indians, 28 August 1700, NYCD 4:741.
- 82 [Conf. between Callière and the Iroquois], 18 July 1700, AN, CIIA, 18:81–83. La Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:136–47, provides a fuller account of this conference.
- 83 Ibid.
- 84 A central part of peace negotiations during this period was the exchange of prisoners. To fulfill this obligation, and at the request of the Iroquois, Callière sent the Jesuit Father Bruyas, Paul Le Moyne de Maricourt, and Philippe-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire with the returning Indians to bring back French and native prisoners held by the Iroquois (La Potherie au Ministre, 16 October 1700, AN, CIIA, 18:150–51).
- 85 [Conference at Montreal], 3 September 1700, AN, CIIA, 18:84–89; La Potherie au Ministre, 16 October 1700, AN, CIIA, 18:155–58. For the Iroquois version of this conference see Colonel Romer's Account of His Visit to Onondaga, October 1700, NYCD 4:798–99.
- 86 La Potherie au Ministre, 16 October 1700, AN, CIIA, 18:158.
- 87 Ibid. In his published version of this conference, La Potherie reverses the order of the Huron and Iroquois speeches (*Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:171–72). He apparently did not want to leave the impression that the Iroquois had bested one of New France's leading native allies.
- 88 Nanfan had replaced Governor Bellomont, who had died in March 1701.
- 89 Journal of Messrs. Bleeker and Schuyler's Visit to Onondaga, June 1701, NYCD 4:890.
- 90 La Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:187–88.
- 91 Journal of Messrs. Bleeker and Schuyler's Visit to Onondaga, June 1701, NYCD 4:891.
- 92 Ibid., 892. Callière had been opposed to the building of the fort, fearing that it would offend the Iroquois and disrupt peace negotiations. The minister, convinced by Antoine Laumet la Mothe de Cadillac that the fort would be useful in controlling the Iroquois, ordered that it be built (Callière au Ministre, 16 October 1700, AN, CIIA, 18:67–68; Dale Miquelon, *New France, 1701–1744: A Supplement to Europe* [Toronto, 1987], 33–34).
- 93 Journal of Bleeker and Schuyler's Visit, NYCD 4:892.
- 94 Ibid., 891.
- 95 Ibid., 894.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 Ibid.
- 98 Ibid.
- 99 Ibid., 893–94.
- 100 Richter is mistaken in his assumption that neutrality was first suggested to the Iroquois by Father Bruyas at Onondaga in June 1701 (*Ordeal of the Longhouse*,



- 361 n. 44). Callière had written as early as October 1700 that he hoped to keep the Iroquois neutral (Callière au Ministre, 16 October 1700, AN, C11A, 18:67). He took the opportunity to do so when he met with Teganissorens in the spring of 1701, and at Onondaga in June of that year the Iroquois leader accepted the French proposal. When Bruyas advised the Iroquois in June 1701 to remain neutral, he was merely repeating what Callière had already asked.
- 101 Journal of Bleeker and Schuyler's Visit, NYCD 4:892.
- 102 Teganissorens chose not to attend either meeting as he did not want to choose sides (La Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:189-90).
- 103 Conference of Lieutenant-Governor Nanfan with the Indians, July 1701, NYCD 4:896. Page references to this document that follow are placed in parentheses in the text. See also Wraxall, *Indian Affairs*, 37-42, on the 1701 treaty in Albany.
- 104 The Iroquois were not above playing the fool when it suited their purposes.
- 105 The Iroquois needed the English to do their dirty work to prevent damage to their relations with the French.
- 106 If the governor was startled by this obvious rejection of his abilities or authority, his reaction is not recorded.
- 107 NYCD 4:908-11. Richter correctly observes that "Livingston may have planted the seeds for Iroquois insistence that he personally carry the deed to England (his political opponents were attempting to prevent him from going to the capital to argue his case for huge arrears in his accounts with the province), but the deed itself seems to have been the Five Nations' idea" (*Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 361-62 n. 47).
- 108 NYCD 4:908-9. See Elisabeth Tooker, "Wyandot," in HNAI, 404-5, for synonyms of "Tionondade" and "Aragaritkas"; Ives Goddard, "Mascouten," in HNAI, 668, synonymy at 671. On the dispersal of these groups see Campeau, *Catastrophe démographique*, and Heidenreich, "Great Lakes Basin," pls. 35, 37-38.
- 109 Lake Ontario (William M. Beauchamp, "Aboriginal Place Names of New York," New York State Museum Bulletin 108, Archaeology 12 [Albany, NY, 1907], 169).
- 110 Lake Erie (Beauchamp, "Aboriginal Place Names," 66-67).
- 111 The Miamis. In 1700 the Miamis were located west and south of Lake Michigan (Heidenreich, "Expansion of French Trade," pl. 38; Heidenreich and Noël, "Trade and Empire," pl. 39; Charles Callender, "Miami," in HNAI, 681, synonymy at 688).
- 112 In a footnote, O'Callaghan identifies "Quadoge" as present-day Chicago (NYCD 4:908).
- 113 Irondequoit, Irondequoit Bay; in the vicinity of the mouth of the Genesee River, New York State (Beauchamp, "Aboriginal Place Names," 116-18). The Genesee River and its valley formed the western boundary of the Seneca homeland (Thomas S. Ablor and Elisabeth Tooker, "Seneca," in HNAI, 505).
- 114 NYCD 4:908-9.
- 115 That is, the former country of the Hurons and the "seven nations."
- 116 NYCD 4:909. No contemporary map illustrating the deeded area has been discovered. Lahontan includes a map of northeastern North America in his *New Voyages* (1703) that identifies the area north of Lakes Erie and Ontario, bounded by the Ottawa River in the east and the St. Clair River in the west, as

- the hunting lands of the Iroquois. The “Lewis Evans map of the Middle British Colonies in America . . . , 1755,” which is derived partly from the description contained in the 1701 deed, depicts both the “colony” of Skaniaiarade and Iroquois hunting territories. The “colony” encompasses an area from the western end of Lake Erie to about present-day Toronto. The hunting lands stretch from the St. Clair River to about Toronto, and north to Lake Huron. The Iroquois, however, included those lands as far west as present-day Chicago in their deed to the English. The “John Mitchell map of the British Middle Colonies . . . , 1755,” which lays out the limits of the lands claimed by the British, includes the areas north of Lakes Erie and Ontario, to the northern end of Lake Huron, and from the Ottawa River to the eastern shore of Lake Michigan, territory that was allegedly conquered by the Iroquois.
- 117 Heidenreich, “Great Lakes Basin,” pl. 35; Heidenreich, “Huron,” in HNAI, 368–69; Charles Garrad and Conrad E. Heidenreich, “Khionontateronon (Petun),” in HNAI, 394–95; Marian E. White, “Neutral and Wenro,” in HNAI, 407–9; White, “Erie,” in HNAI, 412–15; Goddard, “Mascouten,” 668.
- 118 Propositions of the Five Nations to the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 30 June 1700, NYCD 4:694. See Konrad, “Iroquois Frontier,” 132, 142.
- 119 Heidenreich, “Settlements and Missionaries, 1615–1650,” in *Historical Atlas of Canada*, vol. 1, ed. R. Cole Harris (Toronto, 1987, pl. 34); Heidenreich, “Huron,” 369; Heidenreich, *Huronian: A History and Geography of the Huron Indians, 1600–1650* (Toronto, 1971), map 17. The Hurons controlled and made use of Christian Island, Hope Island, and Beckwith Islands (Thwaites, *Jesuit Relations*, 36:119, 123, 181–89). There is presently no known evidence that other islands lying immediately offshore of the lands laid out in the 1701 deed were used by Indian people. It is assumed here, however, that they were included in the territories over which Indians asserted or claimed sovereignty.
- 120 There is no evidence that the Indians of this region either traveled across, or claimed sovereignty over, any of the Great Lakes. Instead, they appear to have asserted rights only to the mainland and the offshore islands. Therefore, the boundaries laid out in the 1701 deed are generalized, consisting of lines drawn from one geographic/cultural point to another. In reality, boundaries that marked the territories of native peoples most often followed the interfluves or the divides between watersheds or natural drainages.
- 121 NYCD 4:909–10. In 1702 the Five Nations presented several propositions before New York’s Governor Lord Cornbury, one of which dealt with the 1701 treaty and deed.

Wee insist again that your Lordship would be pleased to hearken to us, and take care that our Propositions may not be so slighted and thrown in some hole, as they were last year, for we not only conveyed a considerable Tract of Land to y<sup>e</sup> King and delivered the deed to Capt<sup>n</sup> Nanfan then Lieut<sup>t</sup> Governor, but acquainted him how that y<sup>e</sup> French incroached upon our country and prayed him to send a person over to y<sup>e</sup> King with y<sup>e</sup> said conveyance & named our Secretary M<sup>r</sup> Livingstone as a fitt Person who would have given His Majesty an account of all our affairs. . . . but we see there is no notice taken of what we said, but our Proposition thrown in some Pitt disregarded. . . .

Wee pray that what we requested last year about that subject may be com-

plied with and that M<sup>r</sup> Livingston Secretary for our affairs may be sent to acquaint y<sup>e</sup> Great Queen of England with y<sup>e</sup> state and condition of us and our Country and that ship with good Sayles may be provided him accordingly.

- Livingston never delivered the deed to England, nor was it ever recorded (Conference of Lord Cornbury with the Indians, 19 July 1702, NYCD 4:988; Some Thoughts Upon the British Indian Interest in North America . . . [Peter Wraxall], 1755, NYCD 7:16).
- 122 Conference of Lieutenant-Governor Nanfan, NYCD 4:905. A constant refrain of the Iroquois during this period was the loss of their people to the French in Canada, whether it was a result of the efforts of missionaries, or, in this case, the enticement of trade.
- 123 Ibid.
- 124 Ibid.
- 125 Conference of the Earl of Bellomont with the Indians, August and September 1700, NYCD 4:741.
- 126 Conference of Lieutenant-Governor Nanfan, NYCD 4:906.
- 127 Ibid., 907. Present was one sachem each from the Onondagas, the Oneidas, and the Cayugas. There were two Seneca sachems. No Mohawks are recorded as attending this meeting.
- 128 Ibid. By this statement it becomes clear that by permitting the English to send ministers into their country, the Iroquois had more in mind than facilitating their trade at Albany. The return of their people residing in Canada would not only increase their numbers and their military strength, but at the same time, deny the French Indian allies.
- 129 Ibid.
- 130 See Haan, "Iroquois Neutrality," 322. Jennings writes that the deed "was a challenge for the English to fight in behalf of the Iroquois for a change, instead of the Iroquois fighting for the English. . . . They had had enough of being catspaws" (*Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 212).
- 131 Osgood, *American Colonies*, 473–75. In his report to the Earl of Bellomont in April 1700, Robert Livingston had discussed several recommendations designed generally to increase the trade. He argued that first, efforts should be made to arrange a peace between the Iroquois and the Western Indians. Second, the English should build a fort at Detroit (Mr. Robert Livingston's Report of his Journey to Onondaga, April 1700, NYCD 4:650–51). Livingston, however, was thinking ahead to the establishment of a boundary between New France and the English, and its implications for the disposition of the Indians generally, along with those for trade. "And if in the setling the limits and bounds of the governments, the line might run West from the Northernmost part of this County of Albany, then I doubt not but all these Nations would fall to our share, and withal that all y<sup>e</sup> nations that live on the Lakes and rivers that run by Quebeck the South side to belong to the English and the North side to the French, would put an end to the controversy at once, always including the 5 Nations intirely" (ibid., 651).
- 132 Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 212. Jennings notes that the deed "was later advanced in diplomacy to justify England's claims against France" (*Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 212).

- 133 Trelease, *Indian Affairs*, 362. See Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 10–24, for an important and intelligent discussion of the invention and perpetuation of the myth of the “Iroquois empire” by the British, Anglo-Americans, and the Iroquois, and the place of the Albany treaty of 1701 in its unfolding. Dorothy V. Jones, *License for Empire: Colonialism by Treaty in Early America* (Chicago, 1982), provides a useful overview of the colonial treaty period and insight into the designs that were behind the exaggeration of Iroquois conquests.
- 134 Ibid. In 1683 the Iroquois had “conveyed” some of their land to the English in return for their protection (DHN 1:263; NYCD 3:347). In 1726, during a discussion between Governor Burnet and several Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca headmen, encroachments on Iroquois land were again an issue. Complaining that the French had built a fort at Niagara, the headmen asked that the English “protect them in the quiet Enjoyment of their own lands.” Burnet suggested that the headmen reconfirm the 1701 deed, “which was to submit and give up all their hunting Country to the King,” and at the same time, convey all of their land between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario, along with a sixty-mile wide strip south of Lake Ontario, “so as to include all their Castles and country.” The headmen “would then Expect that His Majesty would be pleased to defend them from the Encroachments of the French” (Conference between Governor Burnet and the Indians, 14 September 1726, NYCD 5:799–800; see also Wraxall, *Indian Affairs*, 168–69). It is possible that the English understood the 1701 deed to be a bona fide conveyance of property, that is, the cession, assignment, transfer, or the yielding up of land by the Indians. Nonetheless, no primary document exists that unequivocally supports such an interpretation, and the actions of the English subsequent to the signing of the deed are not those of a landholder with possessory or proprietary rights. There are no primary documents or historical studies that suggest in any way that the Five Nations believed that they had ceded their lands to the English. According to Peter Wraxall, “They [the Five Nations] put all their Patrimonial Lands and those obtained by conquest under the Protection of the King of Great Britain, to be by him secured for the use of them and their heirs against the encroachments and ambitious designs of the French” (NYCD 7:16).
- 135 The description of the treaty council at Montreal is from La Potherie, *Histoire de l’amérique septentrionale*, 4:193–266. Page references to this work that follow are placed in parentheses in the text. For a summary of the Montreal meeting see Report of Messrs. Bleeker and Schuyler’s Visit to Onondaga, 22 September 1701, NYCD 4:918–19. While the Mohawks did not participate in this meeting, they did ratify the peace agreement after the council had ended. In general, the Mohawks opposed peace with the French, frequently making their position known by absenting themselves from treaty councils.
- 136 Richter incorrectly states that the delegation of League and Canadian Iroquois made up two hundred canoes (*Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 361 n. 44). La Potherie writes that representatives from Onondaga, Cayuga, and Oneida left Sault Saint Louis for Montreal as seven hundred natives from the Western tribes arrived (*Histoire de l’amérique septentrionale*, 4:197–200). The two hundred canoes of French native allies, and possibly some mission Iroquois, left for Montreal at least a day later. The Senecas reached Montreal only after all the others had arrived.
- 137 Since at least seven hundred of the one thousand natives present were from the

- pays d'en haut*, that is, the Western Tribes, the Iroquois delegation could not have exceeded three hundred. Allowing for the presence of mission Indians, and those from local tribes, the Iroquois delegation probably did not exceed fifty people. Some thirty-eight natives "signed" the treaty document. Of those, four are Iroquois, one from each of the four tribes (Ratification de la paix . . . , 4 August 1701, AN, C11A, 19:43-44).
- 138 Propositions of the Five Nations to the Commissioners of Indian Affairs, 30 June 1700, NYCD 4:694.
- 139 Ratification de la paix . . . , 4 August 1701, AN, C11A, 19:241.
- 140 On 2 October 1701 Nanfan wrote to the Lords of Trade. "Our Indians are in admirable temper and very firm in their obedience, to his Majesty's & Freindship to us," he reported. "The French are still pressing a neutrality in our Indians, but I will never hear of any such thing, beleiving it to be directly contrary to his Majesty's Interest" (Lieutenant-Governor Nanfan to the Lords of Trade, 2 October 1701, NYCD 4:916).
- 141 La Potherie, *Histoire de l'amérique septentrionale*, 4:183, 243.
- 142 Schuyler's Journal of a Visit to Seneca Country, 23 April to 3 June 1720, NYCD 5:545.
- 143 The Iroquois could deal with encroachments on their lands by other Indian groups, either through force or by co-opting the respective tribe(s) into their alliance network. It was against the advances of the French supported by their considerable military and economic resources where English assistance would be indispensable.